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This paper analyzes the cyclical effects of bank capital buffers using an 
international sample of 2,361 banks from 92 countries over the 1990-2007 period. 
We find that capital buffers reduce the bank credit supply but – through what could 
be “monitoring or signaling effects” – have also an expansionary effect on 
economic activity by reducing lending and deposit rate spreads. This influence on 
lending and deposit rate spreads is more pronunced in developing countries and 
during downturns. The results suggest that capital buffers have a counter-cyclical 
effect in these countries. Our data do not suggest differences in the cyclical effects 
of capital buffers between Basel I and Basel II. 
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Bank capital regulation is the most traditional pillar for regulators and supervisors to 
control bank-risk taking and foster financial stability all over the world.
1 In addition to 
efficiently increasing financial stability, one of the most discussed effects of capital 
regulation is its cyclical effect. This discussion has sparked greater interest since the 
adoption of Basel II and with the current financial crisis. 
 
As Basel II creates a closer link between capital requirements and risk, it makes capital 
requirements more dependent on the business cycle. In a cyclical downturn, when asset 
prices start declining, banks may be forced to undertake continuous writedowns 
(accompanied by increased provisioning), and this raises their need for capital. Capital 
requirements may therefore increase in a cyclical downturn. If banks are highly 
leveraged and capital becomes difficult to raise and/or costly, banks might have to 
reduce their loans, and the subsequent credit squeeze might add to the downturn, 
making the recession deeper. Similarly, during an economic upturn, the amount of 
capital required decreases and the credit supply increases, making the economic upturn 
more marked. These intuitive arguments suggest that capital requirements are pro-
cyclical and that Basel II is more pro-cyclical than Basel I. 
 
The cyclical effects of capital regulation may, however, be lower when capital 
regulations are not binding. Recent empirical evidence shows that most banks keep 
capital buffers which, in some cases, are quite significant (Ayuso et al., 2004; Nier and 
Bauman, 2006; Flannery and Rangan, 2008; Fonseca and González, 2009). Capital 
buffers may even be counter-cyclical if banks tend to increase them, and then reduce 
their credit supply, during upturns. In this case, banks might be making use of capital 
buffers to offset—at least partially—the negative effects of pro-cyclical requirements. 
In contrast, capital buffers may increase the pro-cyclical effects of capital regulation if 
banks decrease them, and then increase their credit supply, during upturns. All this 
implies that the management of bank capital buffers over the course of the business 
cycle might be as important, or even more so, as rules-based capital requirements in 
determining the cyclical impact of capital regulation. 
 
Empirical evidence on the relation between capital buffers and the business cycle is not 
conclusive and varies across countries, suggesting a negative relation in developed 
countries and a less clear relation in developing countries. Ayuso et al. (2004), 
                                                 
1 Over 100 countries implemented the 1987 Basel I Accord, which focuses on bank capital regulation 
(Barth et al., 2004). The Basel II Accord continues to consider bank capital regulation as one of its three 
pillars (Pillar 1), alongside official supervision (Pillar 2) and market discipline (Pillar 3).  5 
 
Lindquist (2004) and Stoltz and Wedow (2005) find a negative relationship between 
capital buffers and the cycle variables for Spanish, Norwegian, and German banks 
respectively. Similarly, Bikker and Metzemakers (2004) and Jokipii and Milne (2009) 
find a negative relationship between capital buffers and the cycle for 29 OECD and the 
EU15 countries. This negative co-movement might exacerbate the pro-cyclical impact 
of bank capital requirements. Jokipii and Milne (2009) find opposite results for the 10 
accession countries that joined the European Union in 2005. This positive co-movement 
might reduce the pro-cyclical impact of bank capital requirements. Fonseca and 
González (2010) also find different patterns across countries. They find a negative 
relation between economic cycle and capital buffers in seven countries – Chile, 
Denmark, France, Indonesia, the Philippines, the UK, and the US. In 5 countries – 
Brazil, Hong Kong, India, Italy, and Romania – there is a positive relation. They do not 
find a statistically significant relation between capital buffer and the business cycle in 
the remaining 59 countries. 
 
The above literature assumes that higher capital buffers reduce banks’ credit supply and 
have a contractionary effect on economic activity. This suggests that a negative 
(positive) relation between capital buffers and the cycle might exacerbate (reduce) the 
pro-cyclical effects of capital regulation. Capital buffers, however, may have additional 
effects on the business cycle if they influence the lending and deposit rate spreads (Meh 
and Moran, 2009; Agénor and Pereira da Silva, 2009a; Agénor et al., 2009). There may 
be a negative relation between capital buffers and lending rate spreads if capital buffers 
induce banks to screen and monitor borrowers more carefully or if the switching costs 
for borrowers are relevant. In such cases, bank capital may play a significant cyclical 
role that has not yet been empirically analyzed: the higher the capital buffer, the lower 
the lending rate spread and the greater the expansionary effect on economic activity. 
This expansionary effect of bank capital buffers through the reduction of lending 
spreads is in contrast to the reduction effect associated to date with a lower credit 
supply.  
 
Moreover, there may be a negative relation between capital buffers and deposit rate 
spreads in the presence of market discipline by depositors or if capital represents a 
signal that the bank’s financial position is strong, so that it reduces the intensity of 
regulatory scrutiny. In this case, a higher capital buffer would reduce the deposit rate, 
tending today to increase consumption through intertemporal substitution. The result is 
an expansion of economic activity. This expansionary effect of bank capital buffers 
through the reduction of deposit rate spreads contrasts again with the contractionary 
effect associated to date with a lower credit supply.  6 
 
The theoretical opposing effects of capital buffers on the business cycle increase the 
relevance of empirical analysis. The cyclical effects of capital buffers through their 
influence on lending and deposit rate spreads have been theoretically suggested by 
Agénor and Pereira da Silva (2009a), and Agénor et al. (2009) but, to our knowledge, 
not empirically tested. In this paper, we address this question empirically for a set of 
international bank data from developed and developing countries. Using standard 
econometric panel data techniques, we build an incomplete panel of 2,361 banks from 
92 countries over the 1990-2007 period and control for the endogeneity of explanatory 
variables and unobservable bank effects. 
 
We make several contributions. First, we analyze the influence of capital buffers and 
risk-adjusted capital ratios on lending and deposit spreads in an international bank 
database. This is a novelty of our paper because literature analyzing the lending channel 
of bank capital has focused on the effect of capitalization on loan growth.
2 
 
To our knowledge, Lown and Peristiani (1996), Hubbard et al. (2002), and Coleman et 
al. (2002) provide evidence of a negative relation between bank capital and lending 
interest rates for the U.S. They do not provide evidence outside the U.S and focus on 
capital ratios instead of capital buffers. Capital buffers might, however, be more 
important than capital ratios as determinants of the cyclical effects of capital regulation 
because they internalize if capital requirements are binding or not.
3 For that reason, we 
focus on capital buffers as a better proxy of bank financial health, but also provide 
evidence on risk-adjusted capital ratios to allow comparison with existing literature. 
Regarding the relation between bank capital and the cost of deposits, Demirgüc-Kunt 
and Huizinga (2004) provide evidence on an international set of banks from 30 
countries, suggesting that banks with higher capital ratios pay lower interest rates for 
deposits. However, they do not focus on capital buffers or the cyclical effects of capital 
regulation. 
 
Second, we directly analyze the cyclical effects of capital buffers by analyzing their 
influence on the relation between the business cycle and, respectively, lending and 
deposit rate spreads. Higher capital buffers promoting a more negative (positive) 
relation between the business cycle and the lending rate spread can be expected to 
                                                 
2 Hancok et al. (1995), Thakor (1996), and Kishan and Opiela (2000), among others, emphasize the 
importance of bank capital on lending behavior in the U.S. Altumbas et al. (2002) and Gambacorta and 
Mistrulli (2004) provide evidence for Europe. 
3 Previous studies use the capital ratio as a proxy negatively related to bank risk. However, when the 
minimum capital required is adjusted to bank risk, the capital ratio may be positively related to bank risk 
if the requirement is binding.  
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provide evidence on its pro-cyclicality (counter-cyclicality). In this case, the lower 
(higher) lending rate spreads that capital buffers promote during upturns might increase 
(reduce) the expansion of economic activity by expanding investment by firms. In the 
same way, higher capital buffers promoting a more negative (positive) relation between 
the business cycle and the deposit rate spread might provide evidence on its pro-
cyclicality (counter-cyclicality). In this case, the lower (higher) deposit rate spreads that 
capital buffers promote during upturns might increase (reduce) the expansion of 
economic activity by expanding consumption-depending on the degree of intertemporal 
substitution. Previous studies have focused on how capital buffers vary over the 
business cycle, assuming that capital buffers reduce economic activity through a 
reduction of the credit supply. To our knowledge, there are no studies analyzing and 
testing the potential expansionary effect of capital buffers through a reduction in interest 
rate spreads. 
 
Third, we compare the cyclical effects of capital buffers between developed and 
developing countries. Much of the analytical and empirical work on the cyclicality of 
capital regulatory regimes focuses largely on industrialized countries and therefore does 
not account for the type of financial market imperfections that middle-income 
developing countries face. Agénor and Pereira da Silva (2009a) suggest that capital 
buffers may play a more important role in these environments as signals to depositors of 
a greater commitment to screening and monitoring borrowers, because of either the 
absence, or the lack of credibility, of the deposit insurance system. 
 
Fourth, we examine the differences in cyclicality between Basel I and Basel II. Most of 
the previous work comparing cyclical effects between Basel I and Basel II uses 
simulated data. To our knowledge, only Kerbl and Sigmund (2009) use realized data 
from Austrian banks. We use realized data from an international bank database that 
allows not only comparison between Basel I and Basel II in an ample dataset but also 
analyzes any different effects across developed and developing countries. 
 
Finally, we consider the possibility that lending and interest rates may face adjustment 
costs in their moving toward their equilibrium levels by using the Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM) estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) for dynamic 
panel data. GMM models also control for the presence of unobserved bank-specific 
effects and the endogeneity of the explanatory variables. Lown and Peristani (1996), 
Coleman et al. (2002), and Hubbard et al. (2002) do not control for adjustment cost and 
endogeneity when they analyze the relation between capital buffers and lending interest 
rates in the U.S. market. 8 
 
Our results indicate that well-capitalized banks are less constrained by capital 
requirements and charge lower interest spreads in their loans. This is in line with the 
results of Hubbard et al. (2002) for the United States. In the same way, well-capitalized 
banks pay lower interest spreads for their deposits. However, this influence of capital 
buffers on lending and deposit rate spreads varies across countries depending on their 
development stage and the business cycle. We find that capital buffers influence more 
economic activity through these two channels (lending and deposit spreads) in 
developing countries during downturns. The consequence is that capital buffers produce 
a counter-cyclical effect in these countries. We do not, however, find statistically 
significant differences in the cyclical effects of capital buffers between Basel I and 
Basel II. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical 
background and discusses the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the characteristics of the 
dataset and the empirical methodology, while Section 4 shows the results of the cyclical 
effects of bank capital on lending and deposit rate spreads and how they vary between 
developed and developing countries. Finally, Section 5 presents our conclusions. 
 
2.  Theoretical background and hypotheses  
 
The macroeconomic consequences of bank capital buffers have received growing 
interest in the debate on their cyclical effects, especially after the 2008 global financial 
crisis suggested the need to tame macro-financial pro-cyclicality in mature economies. 
An increase in bank capital buffers has traditionally been associated with a reduction in 
the credit supply, leading to a contractionary effect on economic activity. The literature 
analyzes whether bank capital buffers increase during upturns, reducing the pro-
cyclicality of capital requirements, or if they decrease during upturns, increasing the 
pro-cyclicality of capital requirements (Ayuso et al., 2004; Bikker and Metzemakers, 
2004; Lindquist, 2004; Stoltz and Wedow, 2005; and Jokipii and Milne, 2009). Most of 
the empirical evidence finds a negative co-movement of capital buffers and the cycle for 
developed countries, suggesting their pro-cyclicality. 
 
Agénor and Pereira da Silva (2009a) and Agénor et al. (2009) have recently suggested 
two additional channels through which capital buffers may have cyclical effects. They 
may: 1) influence investment by firms by affecting lending rate spreads; and 2) 
influence consumption by households by affecting deposit rate spreads. 
 9 
 
Bank capital buffers may reduce bank lending spreads for at least two reasons. First, 
bank capital may induce banks to screen and monitor borrowers more carefully. Meh 
and Moran (2008) develop a model where banks lack the incentive to monitor 
borrowers adequately, because monitoring is privately costly and any resulting increase 
in the risk of loan portfolios is mostly borne by investors. This moral hazard problem is 
mitigated when banks are well capitalized and have more to lose from loan default. As a 
result, higher bank capital increases the ability to raise loanable funds and facilitates 
bank lending. Agénor et al. (2009) use the same idea in a general equilibrium model to 
also show that well-capitalized banks charge a lower risk premium to borrowers. 
Second, if a borrower faces switching costs in a relationship with an individual bank, 
bank-specific financial health might affect a borrower’s cost of funds. In a market 
without information asymmetries, bank-specific increases in the cost of funds would not 
be passed on to loan customers because borrowers could simply switch banks. With 
information asymmetries, however, borrowers face switching costs in changing lenders 
and hence an idiosyncratic increase in banks’ cost of funds might increase the cost of 
funds to borrowers. If higher capital buffers reduce bank’s cost of funds, well-
capitalized banks might charge lower risk premium to borrowers and increase 
investment. 
 
There is empirical evidence for the U.S consistent with capital-constrained banks 
charging higher spreads on their loans (Hubbard et al., 2002, Coleman et al., 2002). 
Lown and Peristiani (1996), moreover, find that undercapitalized banks contributed to 
the 1990 credit slowdown in the U.S. by charging consumers a higher-than-average loan 
rate relative to better-capitalized institutions. Empirical evidence outside U.S and/or 
analyzing capital buffers is, to our knowledge, not available. 
 
A second channel through which capital buffers might influence economic activity is by 
influencing deposit interest spreads and, consequently, consumption. Several empirical 
studies, mostly for the U.S., find a negative relation between the cost of deposits and the 
capital ratio (Ellis and Flannery, 1992; Cook and Spellman, 1994; Flannery and 
Sorescu, among others). Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) find that the negative 
relation remains on average in a sample of banks from 30 countries. This evidence is 
generally interpreted as consistent with market discipline in the deposit market. Agénor 
and Pereira da Silva (2009a) also explain the negative relation through a signaling effect 
when households internalize the fact that more capital increases banks’ incentives to 
screen and monitor their borrowers. Depositors are, therefore, willing to accept a lower, 
but safer, return. The strength of this bank capital channel, which operates through the 10 
 
deposit rate, depends on the presence and the magnitude of an intertemporal substitution 
effect on consumption. 
 
The above arguments lead us to establish the first hypothesis: 
 
H.1. Capital buffers reduce the interest rate spreads that banks charge for loans 
and the interest rate spreads they pay for deposits. 
 
2.1. Developed vs. developing countries 
 
Most existing studies on the cyclicality of capital regulatory regimes, both theoretical 
and empirical, are based on industrialized countries. However, the pervasiveness of 
financial market imperfections in developing countries, coupled with their greater 
vulnerability to shocks, warrant a focus on the potential different cyclical effect of 
capital buffers in these countries. For middle-income countries, in particular, these 
imperfections cover a broad spectrum: underdeveloped capital markets; limited 
competition among banks; more severe asymmetric information problems, which make 
screening out good from bad credit risks difficult and foster collateralized lending; a 
pervasive role of government in banking; uncertain public guarantees; inadequate 
disclosure and transparency, coupled with weak supervision and a limited ability to 
enforce prudential regulations; weak property rights and an inefficient legal system, 
which make contract enforcement difficult and also encourage collateralized lending; 
and a volatile economic environment, which increases exposure to adverse shocks and 
magnifies both the possibility of default by borrowers and the risk of bankruptcy for 
financial institutions. 
 
The higher degree of market imperfections in developing economies may then magnify 
the above-mentioned role that bank capital buffers play in loan and deposit markets. 
Greater information asymmetries increase switching costs in bank relationships and/or 
the cost for banks of screening and monitoring borrowers. In this case, capital has a 
stronger effect by signaling to depositors that there will be greater supervision of 
borrowers. The above reasons favor a greater negative relation in developing countries 
between capital and both lending and deposit rate spreads. Thus our second hypothesis 
is: 
 
H.2. The negative influence of bank capital buffers on lending rates and banks’ 
cost of deposits is greater in developing countries. 11 
 
We also expect that the negative influence of capital buffers on deposit rate spreads 
varies across countries depending on the presence of deposit insurance that could offset 
somehow the signaling effect of buffers. It has long been suggested that more generous 
deposit insurance weakens the market discipline enforced by depositors and encourages 
banks to take greater risks (Merton, 1977). Some empirical evidence confirms this 
effect, showing that deposit insurance increases the likelihood of banking crises 
(Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002) and that risk-shifting incentives are positively 
related to the generosity of deposit insurance (Hovakimian et al. 2003). According to 
this evidence, if more generous deposit insurance reduces market discipline, it will also 
make the cost of deposits less sensitive to bank capital. For this reason, we forecast that 
the negative relation between the capital buffer and the deposit rate spread will be lower 
in countries with explicit deposit insurance. Thus our third hypothesis is: 
 
H.3. The presence of an explicit deposit insurance diminishes the ability of bank 
capital buffers to reduce deposit rate spreads. 
 
2.2. Cyclical effects of capital buffers 
 
The influence of bank’s financial health on reducing lending and deposit rate spreads 
may spark an expansionary effect for economic activity because they help increase, 
respectively, investment by firms and household consumption. This effect comes from a 
macro, general equilibrium perspective and is different from the financial, partial 
equilibrium perspective that sees a traditional contractionary effect associated with the 
reduction of credit supply, present in most of the previous literature links with higher 
capital buffers. Thus, if capital buffers are increased during an expansion with the initial 
objective of being counter-cyclical, they may actually turn out to be pro-cyclical if the 
reduction in loan and deposit rate spreads outweighs the reduction of credit supply. 
These opposing effects make the analysis of the cyclical effects of capital buffers an 
empirical question. 
 
Moreover, the influence of capital buffers on lending and deposit rate spreads might 
vary over the business cycle and among developed and developing countries. If existing 
information asymmetries become more pronounced during periods of financial distress, 
we can expect higher capital buffers to induce a higher reduction in interest rates (loans 
and deposits) during downturns. Aditionally, during downturns capital requirements are 
more binding and differences in bank capital across banks are more relevant. Poorly 
capitalized banks becomes more capital constrained during downturns and might charge 
higher spreads on loans relative to better capitalized banks. Consistent with this 12 
 
behavior, Lown and Peristiani (1996) find surrounding the 1990 credit slowdown in the 
U.S. that the correlation between capital and loan rates in the U.S. became increasingly 
more negative in 1989 and only started to narrow roughly a year after the end of the 
recession. Thus, if the expansionary effects associated with higher capital buffers are 
higher during downturns than in upturns, we can even expect a counter-cyclical effect 
for capital buffers.  
 
As information asymmetries are greater in developing countries, we expect capital 
buffers to be more counter-cyclical (less pro-cyclical) in these countries. Thus, our 
fourth hypothesis is 
 
H.4. Capital buffers are more counter-cyclical (less pro-cyclical) in developing 
countries. 
 




We obtain consolidated bank balance-sheet and income-statement data (in US dollars 
and in real prices) from the Fitch-IBCA Ltd. BankScope Database for 1990-2007. Our 
starting point is the 152 countries included in the World Bank’s Bank Regulation and 
Supervision database, for which information about bank capital requirements is 
available. We eliminate 55 countries because of the lack of data in Bankscope to 
calculate bank explanatory variables for at least three consecutive years and five 
countries because we do not have information on bank concentration and the growth of 
GDP per capita. The final sample covers 92 countries. 
 
3.2. Econometric model 
 
We apply the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator developed for dynamic 
models of panel data by Arellano and Bond (1991). This methodology is specifically 
designed to address three relevant econometric issues: (1) the presence of unobserved 
bank-specific effects, which are eliminated by taking first-differences of all variables; 
(2) the autoregressive process in the data regarding the behavior of interest rate spreads 
(i.e., the need to use a lagged dependent variables model to capture the dynamic nature 
of the interest rate spread); and (3) the likely endogeneity of the explanatory variables. 
The panel estimator controls for this potential endogeneity by using instruments based 
on lagged values of the explanatory variables. 13 
 
Our basic models to estimate the influence of capital buffer on lending and deposits rate 
spreads are: 
 
[] 1                                                                                                         T   Country                               









, j 5 t j, 4 t i,   3 , t i,   2 1 - t i,    1 0 ,
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α α α α α α
+ + + +
+ + + + + + =
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= =
t t i t i LOANRATE
 
[] 2                                                                                                             T   Country                            









, 5 t j, 4 t i,   3 , t i,   2 1 - t i,    1 0 ,
ε ν β β
β β β β β β
+ + + +
+ + + + + + =
∑ ∑
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t j t i t i COSTDEP
 
 
where LOANRATEi,t is the average spread of loan rates for bank i in year t. We 
measure it as the ratio of interest income to total earning assets minus the government 
interest rate. The government rate is the Treasury bill rate where available; otherwise, it 
is the discount rate.
4 
 
COSTDEPi,t is the average spread of deposit rates for bank i in year t. We follow 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) to define it as the ratio of interest expense to 
interest-bearing debt of the bank minus the government interest rate. The government 
rate is the Treasury bill rate where available; otherwise, it is the discount rate. 
 
The importance of adjustment costs is captured by using a partial adjustment model that 
includes the first lag of the dependent variable (LOANRATEi,t-1 and COSTDEPi,t-1). A 
positive and significant coefficient for this variable would indicate that adjustment costs 
are relevant. 
 
BUFFERi,t is the capital buffer for bank i in year t. We measure capital buffers in 
relative and absolute terms. RBUFFER is the relative capital buffer, i.e., the difference 
between capital and the requirement divided by the requirement. ABUFFER is the 
absolute capital buffer measured as the difference between capital and the requirement. 
To save space, we only report results measuring capital buffers in relative terms 
(RBUFFER). The results do not change when we measure buffers in absolute terms. 
 
CAPITALi,t is the capital of bank i in year t divided by its risk-weighted assets. We 
include CAPITAL as an alternative to BUFFER to analyze differential effects bweteen 
capital buffers and total capital ratios. This analysis also allows us to compare our 
results with existing literature focusing on total capital ratios. Capital ratios, 
requirements, and capital buffers by country are reported in Table 1. Figure 1 shows the 
                                                 
4 Agénor and Pereira da Silva (2009a) and Agénor et al. (2009) define the spread in terms of differences 
with respect to the central bank policy rate. Our empirical approach fits to its theoretical analysis. 14 
 
evolution of relative capital buffers and risk-adjusted capital ratios for developed and 
developing countries over the 1989-2007 period. Banks in developing countries hold on 
average larger capital buffers and differences in RBUFFER and CAPITAL are 
statistically significant, at least at the 10 per cent level, in 10 and 12 years, respectively.  
 
BANK includes a set of bank-specific characteristics: size, collateral, liquid asset, and 
loans. We control for the influence of bank size (SIZE) for several reasons. Big banks 
might be thought to have smaller buffers if, as the “too-big-to-fail” hypothesis suggests, 
they believe that they will receive support from the regulator in the event of difficulties, 
or if they have lower risk as a consequence of the enhanced diversification of their asset 
portfolio. These arguments predict a negative coefficient for SIZE. We use the natural 
logarithm of total bank assets as a measure of bank size. 
 
We also include the percentage of loans with collateral (COLLATERALTA), the 
percentage of liquid assets (LATA), and the percentage of total loans (TLNTA) to total 
bank assets. Although not reported, we check that results do not vary when we include 
non-performing loans and allowance for loan loss as additional bank control variables. 
The inclusion of these two variables, however, reduced our bank sample due to lack of 
data. 
 
CONCj,t is the bank market concentration of country j in year t. If market concentration 
is a proxy of market power we expect to find positive coefficients for CONC to explain 
lending rate spreads, and negative coefficients in the deposit rate spreads equation. We 
measure bank concentration as the fraction of bank assets held by the three largest 
commercial banks in a country. This variable comes from the Beck et al. (2009) 
database. 
 
Annual growth in real per capita gross domestic product (GDPGR) is included to 
control for the potential cyclical behavior of loan and deposit rates. A negative relation 
between loan rates and the growth of real per capita gross domestic product offers 
support for a pro-cyclicality of interest rates. Data on GDP growth come from the 
International Financial Statistics of the IMF. 
 




j Country ) is included to control for country-




t T ) captures any 
unobserved bank-invariant time effects not included in the regression. Finally,    i ν is an 15 
 
unobservable bank-specific effect, which is assumed to be constant over time; and    it ε is 
the white noise error term. 
 
We control for the potential endogeneity of BUFFER, CAPITAL, COLLATERALTA, 
LATA, TLNA, CONC, and GDPGR in the GMM estimations using two-to-four period 
lags of the same variables as instruments. We use one-step estimation and specify the 
robust estimator of the variance-covariance matrix of the parameters. We also examine 
the hypothesis that there is no second-order serial correlation in the first-difference 
residuals (m2). In our models this hypothesis is not rejected. First-order serial 
correlation (m1) in the differentiated residuals is attributable to the first difference of 
models. 
 
To analyze the cyclical effects of capital buffers, we study how they influence the 
relation between the business cycle and interest rate spreads. To do it, we include in the 
regressions the interaction between BUFFER/CAPITAL and GDPGR. In our models, 
first, a negative relation between the growth of GDP and the interest rate spreads would 
imply pro-cyclicality (lending and deposit spreads fall during booms and increase 
during downswings). Then, a positive (negative) coefficient for the interaction 
BUFFER/CAPITALxGDPGR would imply that bank capital reduces (increases) the 
pro-cyclicality. The models are: 
 
[] 3                                                         T   Country       GDPGR x  CAPITAL / BUFFER                             
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Mean values by country of the variables used in the paper are reported in Panel A of 
Table 1. Correlations in Panel B show that capital buffers in relative and absolute terms 
are highly correlated (correlation of 0.985). Loan and deposit rates correlate positively 
with capital buffers (absolute and relative), collateral, liquid assets, and bank 
concentration. Loan and deposit rates, however, correlate negatively with total loans and 
growth in real per capita GDP. 
 





4. Empirical results 
 
4.1. The bank lending and deposit channels of capital buffers 
 
This section analyzes whether capital buffers and risk-adjusted capital ratios influence 
lending and deposit rate spreads in our international bank dataset. Panel A of Table 2 
reports the results for the influence of bank capital on lending rate spreads. Panel B 
reports the results for the influence of bank capital on bank deposit rate spreads. The 
non-significance of the m2 statistic indicates no second-order serial correlation in the 
first-difference residuals. These are the conditions required for consistency of the GMM 
estimates.
5 The lagged dependent variables have positive coefficients in all estimations, 
confirming the relevance of adjustment cost in the movement of lending and deposit 
rates and the appropriateness of using GMM estimations. 
 
Results in columns (1) to (4) indicate that the effect of capital on lending interest 
spreads is always negative and statistically significant. The results are similar using both 
capital buffers and risk-adjusted capital ratios. This suggests that well-capitalized banks 
are less constrained by capital requirements and charge lower interest spreads in their 
loans. This result is consistent with the evidence for the United States reported in 
Hubbard et al. (2002), which suggests that the capital position of individual U.S. banks 
negatively affects the interest rate at which their clients borrow, and in Coleman et al. 
(2002), who found that capital-constrained banks charge higher spreads on their loans.  
 
Bank control variables have the expected influence on lending rate spreads. Although 
coefficients are not statistically significant, higher values of collateral reduce lending 
rate spreads. A higher percentage of liquid assets is associated with higher lending rate 
spreads. The ratio of total loans to total bank assets does not have statistically 
significant coefficients. Bank concentration has positive coefficients, although only one 
is statistically significant in column (1), consistent with a greater negotiation power of 
banks in more concentrated markets. We do not obtain significant coefficients for 
growth in per capita GDP. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
                                                 
5 The absence of first-order serial correlation in the first-difference residuals indicated by the non-
significant values of m1 in some estimation suggests that errors in levels follow a random walk. This fact 
does not affect the consistency of the GMM estimates in the first-difference model (Arellano and Bond, 
1991). 17 
 
The negative and statistically significant coefficients of RBUFFER and CAPITAL in 
columns (5) to (8) indicate that well-capitalized banks pay lower interest spreads for 
their deposits. This result is consistent with Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) when, 
in an international database of banks from 30 countries, they find that, on average, safer 
banks pay lower interest rates for deposits. It suggests the presence of market discipline 
or a positive signaling effect for bank capital. 
 
Bank control variables have the expected influence on deposit rates. The negative 
coefficients for size are consistent with a lower risk for large banks. Big banks may 
have a lower cost of deposits if, as the “too-big-to fail” hypothesis suggests, depositors 
believe that they will receive support from the regulator in the event of difficulties, or if 
they have greater opportunities of asset portfolio diversification. Other bank control 
variables and market concentration do not have statistically significant coefficients. 
Finally, we obtain negative coefficients for growth in per capita GDP, suggesting that 
banks pay lower spreads in deposit rates during upswing periods. 
 
4.2. Developed vs. Developing countries 
 
We now analyze whether there are differences in the two bank capital channels across 
countries depending on the level of development. We sequentially include an interaction 
term between capital buffers (total capital ratios) and dummy variables capturing the 
country’s development. We use several dummy variables: DEVELOP takes a value of 1 
for countries classified as high income and upper middle income and zero for countries 
classified as low income and lower middle income;
6 OECD takes a value of 1 for 
OECD countries and zero otherwise; G20 takes a value of 1 for countries belonging to 
the G20 group and zero otherwise; and G8 takes a value of 1 for countries belonging to 
the G8 group and zero otherwise. The inclusion of country dummies avoids the need for 
dummy development variables to enter the regression on their own and allows us to 
focus only on their interaction terms. Results are reported in Table 3 for the lending rate 
and in Table 4 for the cost of deposits. 
 
In Table 3, we obtain positive coefficients for the interaction terms 
RBUFFERxDEVELOP and RBUFFERxOECD whereas RBUFFER keeps the negative 
and statistically significant coefficients found in estimations of Table 2. We even obtain 
more statistically significant results when we use the risk-adjusted capital ratio instead 
of the capital buffer as proxy of bank’s financial health. This indicates that the negative 
                                                 
6 Economies are divided according to GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank’s Atlas method. 
Low income and middle income economies are sometimes referred to as developing economies.  18 
 
relation between capital buffers (risk-adjusted capital ratios) and lending rate spreads 
found on average for our sample disappears in developed and OECD countries. It 
suggests that it is in developing countries where well-capitalized banks charge lower 
interest rate spreads in loans, i.e., where the bank’s financial health has a greater 
influence on lending rates. We do not, however, obtain statistically significant 
coefficients for interaction terms of countries belonging to the G20. 
 
The greater sensitivity of lending rate spreads to banks’ financial health in developing 
countries is consistent with the presence of higher market imperfections in these 
countries and a weaker institutional environment. The more severe asymmetric 
information problems, weaker institutions, and the absence of financial safety net, all of 
which usually characterize developing countries, may give rise to higher switching costs 
for borrowers in bank relationships or to a lower ability of banks to diversify risk. Both 
factors may explain why lending rates are more dependent on banks’ financial health 
and why there is a higher negative relation between bank capital buffers and loan rate 
spreads. 
 
We directly test the influence of the institutional environment in columns (5) and (8). 
We use the KKZ index (KKZ) calculated by Kaufman et al. (2001) as the average of six 
indicators (voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption) as a proxy of the quality of a 
country’s institutional environment. The positive and statistically significant 
coefficients of RBUFFERxKKZ and CAPITALxKKZ confirms that the effect of capital 
on reducing lending rate spreads is stronger in less-developed institutional 
environments. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Results in Table 4 show a positive and statistically significant coefficient for the 
interaction between RBUFFER/CAPITAL and the dummy for OECD countries. We do 
not obtain statistically significant coefficients for the remaining interaction terms 
(DEVELOP, G20, and G8). This indicates that the positive signaling effect to depositors 
of larger capital buffers or capital ratios is higher in non-OECD countries. Again, the 
higher market imperfections in non-OECD countries may lead capital buffers to play a 
more important role by helping banks convey a signal to depositors regarding their 
commitment to screening and monitoring their borrowers, thus raising deposits at a 
lower cost. The positive and statistically significant coefficients for the interaction 
between RBUFFER/CAPITAL and KKZ in columns (5) and (11) confirm that bank 19 
 
capital plays a more relevant role to reduce the cost of deposits in less developed 
institutional environments. 
 
In columns (6) and (12) we test whether the presence of explicit deposit insurance in a 
country diminishes the ability of bank capital to reduce deposit rate spreads (H.3). We 
include an interaction between RBUFFER/CAPITAL and a dummy variable (INS) that 
takes a value of 1 if the country has explicit deposit insurance a zero otherwise. Deposit 
insurance data come from Demirgüc-Kunt et al. (2005). 
 
We do not obtain statistically significant coefficients for RBUFFERxINS and 
CAPITALxINS. Thus, our results do not suggest that the effect of bank capital to 
reduce the cost of deposits is stronger when a country does not have explicit deposit 
insurance. Bank control variables, market concentration, and growth in per capita GDP 
have similar coefficients to those reported in Table 2. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
4.3. Cyclical effects of capital buffers: lending rates and cost of deposits 
 
We now analyze the cyclical effects of capital buffers by focusing on their influence on 
the relationship between growth in GDP per capita and, respectively, lending and 
deposit rate spreads. 
 
A higher (lower) reduction (increase) in lending rate spreads when GDP grows favors 
investment by firms and helps make the upturn more marked. So capital buffers would 
be pro-cyclical (counter-cyclical) when they promote a more negative (positive) relation 
between GDP growth and lending rate spreads. To test whether GDP effects on lending 
rate spreads are equal among banks with different capital ratios we introduce in the 
estimations an interaction term between capital buffer and per capita GDP growth. 
Results are reported in Panel A of Table 5.  
 
The interaction term between capital buffer and GDP growth is positive and statistically 
significant whereas the negative coefficients of RBUFFER increase compared to those 
reported in Panel A of Table 2. This indicates that the reduction in lending rate spreads 
associated with well-capitalized banks is higher during downturns and decreases, or 
even disappears, during upturns. This asymmetric influence of capital buffers on 
lending rate spreads depending on business cycle makes them counter-cyclical. An 
increase in capital buffers during downturns (negative growth in GDP per capita) 20 
 
decreases loan rate spreads and, consequently, reduces the initial downturn. This result 
is consistent with an expansionary effect of capital buffers during downturns because 
the increased benefits of bank screening and monitoring in lending activity outweigh, in 
well-capitalized banks, the reduction in credit supply. During upswings (positive growth 
in GDP per capita), however, an increase in capital buffers also tend to increase lending 
spreads. This is consistent with a contractionary effect of capital buffers during 
upswings. It suggests that the negative effect of the reduction of credit supply associated 
with an increase in capital buffers outweighs, during upturns, the positive effect on 
lending rate spreads caused by the improvement of bank incentives to screen and 
monitor borrowers. Results are similar when we use the risk-adjusted capital ratio 
instead of the capital buffer. 
 
This means that the credit supply of well-capitalized banks is less dependent on the 
business cycle and/or that their incentives to monitor and screen borrowers increase 
more during downturns. This result is consistent with Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004), 
and Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997). On theoretical grounds, our findings are consistent 
with Flannery (1989) and Genotte and Pyle (1991), who argue that well-capitalized 
banks are more risk-averse and select ex ante borrowers with less probability of 
defaulting. This also means that when an economic downturn occurs, well-capitalized 
banks suffer less loan losses and their capital changes less with respect to other banks.  
 
In Panel B of Table 5, we test the cyclical effects of capital buffers via their influence 
on the cost of deposits and, therefore, on consumption. We also obtain a countercyclical 
effect for capital buffers using the same channel. The interaction term between 
RBUFFER and GDPGR has positive and statistically significant coefficients in columns 
(5) to (8). This means that the reduction in the cost of deposits associated with a higher 
capital buffer decreases more the higher the growth in GDP per capita. So, during 
upturns, the expansionary effect of capital buffers caused by cutting back the interest 
paid to depositors and increasing consumption disappears. During downturns, however, 
the signaling effect of capital buffers is greater and helps improve economic activity by 
reducing bank deposit rates and thus promoting consumption. Results are again similar 
when we use the risk-adjusted capital ratio as proxy of bank’s financial health. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Additionally, we test whether the cyclical effects of capital buffers vary depending on 
country development. For this purpose, we introduce sequentially triple interaction 
terms between RBUFFER, GDPGR, and the set of dummy variables positively 21 
 
correlated with the country’s development: DEVELOP, OECD, G20, and G8. Table 6 
reports the results for lending rate spreads and Table 7 for banks’ deposit cost. 
 
We obtain negative and statistically significant coefficients for three out of the four 
triple interaction terms in Table 6 (RBUFFERxGDPGRxDEVELOP, 
RBUFFERxGDPGRxOECD, RBUFFERxGDPGRxG8). We also obtain negative 
coefficients for two of the four triple interaction terms in Table 7 
(RBUFFERxGDPGRxDEVELOP, RBUFFERxGDPGRxG8) when the dependent 
variable is the deposit rate spreads. These results indicate that the counter-cyclical effect 
of capital buffers disappears in developed countries. Only in developing countries did 
we find a significant counter-cyclical effect for capital buffers consistent with the 
hypothesis that the higher market imperfections in developing countries increase the 
benefits of capital buffers in reducing lending and deposit rate spreads. This conclusion 
remains valid when we use a proxy of institutional quality in a country. The negative 
and statistically significant coefficient of the interaction between the KKZ index and 
RBUFFERxGDPGR indicates that the counter-cyclical effect of capital buffers 
diminishes in more institutional developed countries. 
 
Results are less significant, although similar, when we use the risk-adjusted capital ratio 
instead of the capital buffer in columns (6) to (10). 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
4.4. Basel II vs. Basel I 
 
In this section we analyze whether the cyclical effects of capital buffers through lending 
and deposit rate spreads change from Basel I to Basel II since the two requirements 
differ vis-à-vis the role of risk. We include in the estimations a dummy variable 
(BASEL II) that takes the value of 1 for the 2004-2007 period and zero otherwise. It 
needs to be stressed that the dataset does not capture the real implementation of Basel II 
at a country level and that we are assuming in the period segmentation that all 
provisions of Basel II are indeed implemented. 
 
First, we construct the interaction of the capital buffer and the Basel II dummy variable 
to know if the influence of capital buffers on lending and deposit rate spreads changes 
from Basel I to Basel II. The results for lending rate spreads in Panel A of Table 8 show 22 
 
negative, although not statistically significant, coefficients for the interaction terms of 
RBUFFERxBASEL II and CAPITALxBASEL II. RBUFFER and CAPITAL keep the 
negative and significant coefficients initially reported in Table 2. In panel B, we do not 
obtain statistically significant coefficients for the influence of the interaction of 
RBUFFERxBASEL II and CAPITALxBASEL II on banks’ cost of deposits, whereas 
RBUFFER and CAPITAL keep, respectively, their negative influence. These results do 
not suggest a change in the influence of capital buffers on interest rate spreads from 
Basel I to Basel II subject to the caveat mentioned above. 
 
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
 
Second, in Table 9 we analyze whether the cyclical effects of capital buffers on lending 
and deposit rate spreads vary from Basel I to Basel II. We include two interaction terms. 
RBUFFERxGDPGR indicates how the influence of capital buffers on interest rate 
spreads depends on the business cycle in the Basel I period (1990-2003). The triple 
interaction term of RBUFFERxGDPGRxBASEL II indicates how this influence 
changes in the Basel II period (2004-2007). 
 
All the estimations provide positive and statistically significant coefficients for 
RBUFFERxGDPGR indicating that during upturns, there is a reduction in the 
expansionary effects on economic activity of capital buffers that exist during upturns via 
reduction of lending and deposit rate spreads. This asymmetric influence of capital 
buffers depending on the business cycle makes then counter-cyclical. We do not, 
however, obtain statistically significant coefficients for the interaction term of 
RBUFFERxGDPGxBASEL II. The non-significant coefficients for these triple 
interaction terms indicate that there is no difference in the counter-cyclical effect of 
capital buffers between Basel I and Basel II. 
 
INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
This paper analyzes the cyclical effects of bank capital using an international bank panel 
dataset of 2,361 banks from 92 countries over the 1990-2007 period. Our results suggest 
bank capital may influence business cycle through two channels. First, we find that 
well-capitalized banks are less constrained by capital requirements and charge lower 
interest spreads in their loans. Second, we find that well-capitalized banks also pay 
lower interest spreads for their deposits. The influence of bank’s financial health on 23 
 
reducing lending and deposit rate spreads sparks an expansionary effect for economic 
activity because they help increase, respectively, investment by firms and household 
consumption. The paper tests extensively –including for different groupings of countries 
and stages of development—whether this effect outweights the traditional 
contractionary effect associated with the reduction of credit supply that most of the 
previous literature links with higher capital buffers. It is important to determine 
empirically the strength of these opposing effects since a number of official reports and 
academic proposals (see Agénor and Pereira da Silva (2009b) were published after the 
global financial crisis calling for a strengthening of prudential regulation, a more 
accurate evaluation of risk, and a tightening of accounting standards to reduce the 
perceived macro-prudential procyclicality of financial systems. These reports feature 
higher capital buffers prominently as a counter-cyclical device. 
 
Regarding the relationship between lending rate spreads and capital buffers, our results 
suggest that buffers are counter-cyclical. An increase in capital buffers during 
downturns decreases loan rate spreads and, consequently, mitigates the initial downturn 
by supporting investment; during upswings an increase in capital buffers tend to 
increase lending spreads and therefore smooths the upturn. Similarly, regarding the 
cyclical effects of capital buffers via their influence on the cost of deposits and 
ultimately on consumption, we also obtain a countercyclical effect. During upturns, the 
expansionary effect of capital buffers caused by a decrease of deposit rates is reduced. 
However, during downturns, the signaling effect of capital buffers is stronger and helps 
support economic activity by reducing bank deposit rates and thus promoting household 
consumption. 
 
In addition, the influence of capital buffers on lending and deposit rate spreads varies 
across countries depending on their development and also the business cycle. We find 
that capital buffers influence more economic activity through these two channels 
(lending and deposit spreads) in developing countries during downturns. The 
consequence is a counter-cyclical effect for capital buffers in these countries. We do 
not, however, find statistically significant differences in the cyclical effects of capital 
buffers between Basel I and Basel II. 
 
Therefore, the paper contributes to confirm the relevance of the bank capital channel for 
policy purposes. However, by identifying a stronger counter-cyclical effect in 
developing countries, it also alerts policy-makers and regulators that caution should be 
exercized when deriving international standards for bank capital requirements from the 
intuition of the previous partial equilibrium, developed-country centered litterature. 24 
 
After all, if the counter-cyclical role of buffers is stronger in developing countries –
where there was no perceived excessive growth of credit of dubious quality—and 
weaker in developed countries –where indeed there was--, it might mean that additional 
regulatory and prudential safeguards should be sought to moderate macro-financial pro-
cyclicality in the developed world while careful examination of country specificity is 
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Capital buffers and risk-adjusted capital ratios: Developed vs. developing 
countries 
RBUFFER is the capital buffer in relative terms, i.e., the difference between CAPITAL and the requirement divided 
by the requirement. CAPITAL is the total capital adequacy ratio under the Basle rules. It measures Tier 1 + Tier 2 
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Table 1. Summary statistics by country 
Panel A reports descriptive statistics by country. Loan Interest is the ratio of interest income to total earning assets, Deposit Interest is the cost of deposits (the ratio of interest expense to interest-
bearing debt of the bank), CAPITAL is the total capital adequacy ratio under the Basel rules published in the bank’s annual report, Capital Requirement is the percentage of minimum capital 
required over risk-weighted assets defined following Basel I and Basel II, ABUFFER is the capital buffer in absolute terms, RBUFFER is the capital buffer in relative terms, SIZE is the 
logarithm for total bank assets, COLLATERAL is the difference between total assets risks and liquid assets, LATA is the ratio of liquid assets to total assets, TLNTA is the ratio of net total loan 
to total assets, GDPGR is the growth of per capita GDP, CONC is the country’s bank market concentration (the ratio of the three largest banks’ assets to total banking sector assets), GNIPC is 
the gross national income per capita. Bank data are from the BankScope data base of Fitch IBCA and macro data are from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics and Beck at al. (2000) and 
(2009) database. Panel B reports the correlation matrix. *** and ** represent significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics (Mean values) 







Interest  CAPITAL  Capital 
Requirement  ABUFFER RBUFFER  SIZE  COLLATERALTA  LATA  TLNTA GDPGR  CONC  GNIPC 
ALBANIA 13  4  0.2477  0.0351  22.5923  0.12  0.1059  0.8826  12.6135  0.0274  0.6285  0.2802  0.1192  0.8272  1375.5 
ALGERIA 10  2  0.1274  0.0209  21.1800  0.08  0.1318  1.6475  14.3647  0.0127  0.3313  0.3101  0.0830  0.8638  2133 
ARGENTINA 23  4  0.1333  0.0496  18.4652  0.115  0.0696  0.6056  15.3219  0.0296  0.3400  0.5243  0.0326  0.3737  5874.5 
ARMENIA 11  4  0.1936  0.0383  26.5363  0.12  0.1453  1.2113  11.2457  0.0892  0.4336  0.4130  0.2363  0.6387  1019.412 
AUSTRALIA  135 20 0.1011  0.0586 11.9237  0.08  0.0392  0.4904  16.4002  0.0144  0.1363 0.7553  -0.0156 0.5975  22417 
AUSTRIA  26 12  0.1319  0.0488  12.0500  0.08  0.0405  0.5062 15.2988  0.0161  0.3621  0.5111  -0.0150  0.7167 28430 
AZERBAIJAN 67  17  0.1994  0.0610  25.6104  0.1  0.1561  0.1561  11.2968  0.0725  0.2985  0.5668  0.2586  0.7707  1050.625 
BAHRAIN  103 13 0.1941  0.0421 24.8506  0.12  0.1285  1.0708  14.5523  0.0099  0.3342 0.4027  0.0615 0.8170  10750 
BANGLADESH  150 31 0.1320  0.0644 12.5640  0.08  0.0456  0.5705  12.7813  0.0115  0.2663 0.6435  -0.0151 0.4435  348 
BELARUS 51  14  0.3074  0.1173  29.7000  0.1  0.1970  1.9700  12.4068  0.0815  0.3280  0.5334  -0.0119  0.7892  2093.529 
BELGIUM  112 15 0.2010  0.0568 12.7625  0.08  0.0476  0.5953  16.9418  0.0057  0.4761 0.3625  0.0274 0.7557 27390.5 
BENIN 5  1  0.1153  0.0259  11.7800  0.08  0.0378  0.4725  13.3261  0.0246  0.3548  0.4324  0.0400  0.8750  410.5 
BOTSWANA 53  7  0.2607  0.0865  19.3434  0.113  0.0804  0.8665  12.4824  0.0155  0.3489  0.5088  -0.0041  0.8805  3659.5 
BRAZIL  691 128 0.7582 0.1945 24.4055  0.11  0.1340  1.2186  14.2999  0.0223  0.4418 0.4017 0.0018  0.4660  3862.5 
BULGARIA 81  19  0.2073  0.0624  23.4604  0.12  0.1146  0.9550 13.2824  0.0357  0.4300  0.5016  0.0861 0.5238 2216.5 
CANADA  327 54 0.1012  0.0459 16.6335  0.09  0.0756  0.8615  15.0394  0.0067  0.1713 0.6323  0.0523 0.5436  24556 
CHILE  112 19 0.1355  0.0658 14.4057  0.08  0.0640  0.8007  15.2061  0.0207  0.2091 0.6584  0.0322 0.5152 4727.5 
CHINA  224 69 0.0793  0.0313 13.0940  0.08  0.0509  0.6367  16.0233  0.0133  0.2120 0.5413  0.1313 0.6652 1032.5 
COLOMBIA 43  18  0.2713  0.1353  12.2534  0.09  0.0325  0.3614  13.8369  0.0443  0.1894  0.6124  -0.0988  0.3773  2340.5 
COSTA RICA  11  3  0.2472  0.0763  19.1390  0.09  0.1023  1.1566  14.3653  0.0329  0.3467  0.4723  -0.0590  0.6629  3654 
CROATIA 90  26  0.1239  0.0407  20.8844  0.09  0.1130  1.2209  13.5182  0.0330  0.3850  0.5251  0.0924  0.6026  6561.25 
CYPRUS 26  6  0.1774  0.0539  13.6326  0.08  0.0532  0.6238  15.1635  0.0188  0.3493  0.5440  0.0265  0.8752  12874.21 
CZECH  REPUBLIC  152 21 0.2569  0.0719 22.3605  0.08  0.1436  1.7950  14.7887  0.0218  0.4847 0.4017  0.0848 0.6513  7194.118 
DENMARK  778 65 0.1431  0.0360 17.0287  0.08  0.0902  1.1285  13.5814  0.0186  0.1738 0.5716  0.0304 0.7706 35187.5 
ECUADOR 65  21  0.2262  0.0682  20.5692  0.09  0.1156  1.2854  12.0455  0.0746  0.2999  0.4896  -0.1107  0.5395  1775.5 
EGYPT 71  13  0.1723  0.0632  13.7084  0.087  0.0500  0.5860  14.9692  0.0076  0.4297  0.4558  -0.0042  0.5688  1103.5 
FINLAND 47  8  0.1654  0.0834  15.0277  0.08  0.0702  0.8784  15.8167  0.0202  0.2746  0.4713  -0.0125  0.9037  28041.5 
FRANCE  748 131 0.2486 0.0782 16.3814  0.08  0.0838  1.0470  15.3538  0.0101  0.3371 0.4799 0.0091  0.4951  26622 
GAMBIA 10  2  0.3811  0.0440  13.9900  0.08  0.0599  0.7487  11.5168  0.0460  0.5471  0.3230  0.0240  0.9651  319.5 
GEORGIA REP. OF  18  8  0.2252  0.0668  29.3500  0.15  0.1435  0.9566  11.2576  0.0623  0.3285  0.5442  0.0988  0.7403  974.1176 
GERMANY  159 25 0.1128  0.0566 11.6710  0.08  0.0367  0.4588  17.8539  0.0085  0.3079 0.4955  0.0100 0.6130 27855.5 
GHANA 18  3  0.5151  0.0856  10.6880  0.06  0.0468  0.7814  12.6600  0.0322  0.3979  0.3409  -0.1066  0.8710  401 
GREECE  86 18  0.1472  0.0478  14.0767  0.08  0.0607  0.7595 16.0322  0.0182  0.3395  0.5534  0.0586 0.8211 14559 
GUYANA 10  2  0.2373  0.0345  22.6700  0.08  0.1467  1.8337  12.1652  0.0436  0.5698  0.2904  -0.0030  1.0000  784.5 
HONG  KONG  341 41 0.1886  0.0484 27.4049  0.116  0.1579  1.3637  14.9312  0.0194  0.3621 0.4862  0.0164 0.5764 23405.5 
HUNGARY 97  18  0.2542  0.0815  14.6864  0.08  0.0668  0.8358  15.0186  0.0267  0.3599  0.5255  0.0135  0.6295  5772 
ICELAND 8  5  0.1826  0.1064  10.2000  0.08  0.0220  0.2750  14.8325  0.0151  0.2433  0.6143  -0.1150  1.0000  32029.5  30
INDIA  547 64 0.2039  0.0688 13.8820  0.08  0.0545  0.6499  14.5609  0.0169  0.4346 0.4708  0.0286 0.3451  511.5 
INDONESIA  507 84 0.2932  0.1067 22.6839  0.08  0.1468  1.8354  13.5323  0.0178  0.3894 0.5416  0.0312 0.5175  952.5 
IRELAND  10  2  0.0974  0.0545  13.7800 0.08  0.0578  0.7225  17.0595 -0.1489  0.2510  0.6085  0.0650  0.6468  24496 
ISRAEL  148 17 0.1039  0.0491 13.7493  0.09  0.0474  0.5277  15.5204  0.0138  0.2609 0.6721  -0.0056 0.7582 15824.5 
ITALY  1190  184  0.1604  0.0475  17.1023  0.08  0.0910  1.1377 15.0405  0.0168  0.3443  0.5396  0.0255 0.5054 22865 
JAMAICA 17  5  0.5474  0.0693  25.4000  0.1  0.1540  1.5400  14.2948  0.0136  0.6085  0.2588  -0.0541  0.8664  2877 
JAPAN  825 152 0.0456 0.0137 11.2368  0.08  0.0323  0.4046  17.4004  0.0164  0.1352 0.6439  -0.0017  0.3709 34159.5 
JORDAN  100 11 0.1440  0.0404 19.3380  0.12  0.0733  0.6115  14.6368  0.0156  0.4405 0.4362  0.0252 0.8694  1863 
KAZAKHSTAN 84  16  0.1969  0.0869  23.7428  0.12  0.1174  0.9785  13.4924  0.0353  0.3531  0.5585  0.1061  0.6841  2175.294 
KENYA 89  21  0.2126  0.0553  21.1471  0.08  0.1333  1.7161  12.3978  0.0254  0.3699  0.5158  -0.0077  0.5803  421.5 
KOREA REP. OF  199  25  0.1231  0.0674  11.1971  0.08  0.0319  0.3996  17.0803  0.0233  0.1183  0.5836  0.0519  0.3942  11840.56 
KUWAIT 45  5  0.1594  0.0409  20.8778  0.12  0.0887  0.7398  15.9227  0.0103  0.5149  0.4005  0.0535  0.6759  21038.46 
KYRGYZSTAN 23  6  0.4933  0.0254  34.0869  0.12  0.2208  1.8405  10.4638  0.0545  0.5291  0.3637  0.0721  0.8638  409.4118 
LATVIA  133 27 0.3486  0.0306 23.3897  0.1  0.1338  1.3389  12.4131  0.0362  0.4547 0.3988  0.1036 0.5286 4143.5 
LEBANON  407 58 0.3783  0.0689 23.3486  0.0948  0.1386  1.5102  12.7521  0.0330  0.6298 0.2864  0.0306 0.3697  3991.579 
LITHUANIA 64  9  0.1125  0.0313  16.7531  0.1  0.0675  0.6753  13.0969  0.0828  0.3068  0.5490  0.1440  0.8008  4527.056 
MACEDONIA   32  9  0.1482  0.0313  31.4031  0.08  0.2340  2.9253 12.0756  0.0543  0.4136  0.4936  0.0828 0.7774  2190.588 
MALAWI 18  3  0.6129  0.0748  27.5500  0.08  0.1955  2.4437  11.7215  0.0822  0.4313  0.3055  -0.0672  0.8914  190 
MALAYSIA  252 37 0.1444  0.0416 20.5496  0.08  0.1254  1.5687 15.0643  0.0073  0.3389  0.5522  0.0332 0.4422 4016.5 
MALTA 52  6  0.5691  0.0361  19.9788  0.08  0.1197  1.4973  14.0631 0.0144  0.4528  0.3733  0.0223  0.8067  9865.789 
MAURITIUS 16  4  0.1747  0.0787  17.9187  0.1  0.0791  0.7918  12.9593  0.0614  0.3179  0.5764  -0.0450  0.9086  3824.4 
MEXICO  118 18 0.3082  0.1665 16.0211  0.08  0.0802  1.0026  15.4811  0.0253  0.2254 0.5950  0.0112 0.6214  5345 
MOLDOVA REP. OF  35  10  0.2081  0.0719  34.4894  0.12  0.2248  1.8741 11.1991  0.0605  0.3323  0.5603  0.0600 0.6566  598.8235 
NAMIBIA 12  5  0.1282  0.0635  14.2417  0.08  0.0624  0.7802  13.8513  0.0129  0.1066  0.7814  0.0800  0.9055  2366 
NEW ZEALAND  37  10  0.0880  0.0569  11.6513  0.08  0.0365  0.4564  16.2639  0.0085  0.0988  0.8020  0.1240  0.8962  27723.5 
NIGERIA 69  13  0.3380  0.0469  20.8021  0.08  0.1280  1.6002  14.2809  0.0383  0.5803  0.2857  0.0469  0.4204  412.5 
NORWAY  150 17 0.0875  0.0659 12.1120  0.08  0.0411  0.5140  15.1091  0.0112  0.0746 0.8140  0.0487 0.9012 42045.5 
OMAN 61  9  0.0970  0.0375  19.1245  0.12  0.0712  0.5937  14.0991  0.0102  0.2462  0.6697  0.0652  0.7607  6779.444 
PAKISTAN 48  17  0.1342  0.0444  16.5458  0.08  0.8540  1.0682  14.4266  0.0287  0.3265  0.5160  0.0445  0.4406  549.5 
PERU 19  24  0.1695  0.0512  11.3789  0.09  0.0232  0.2573  15.2025  0.0338  0.2498  0.5605  0.0284  0.6866  2073.5 
PHILIPPINES  164 30 0.1768  0.0496 19.4923  0.1  0.0949  0.9492  14.2015  0.0280  0.2764 0.4666  0.0017 0.7001 1069.5 
POLAND  222 41 0.2664  0.0812 16.9675  0.08  0.0896  1.1209  14.2661  0.0235  0.4252 0.4884  0.0414 0.5777  5238.235 
PORTUGAL  42 13  0.2567  0.0744  16.9738  0.08  0.0897  1.1217 15.7934  0.0241  0.4491  0.3763  0.0419 0.5343 12058 
QATAR 24  5  0.0783  0.0204  23.8750  0.096  0.1420  1.4977  14.8914  0.0108  0.3307  0.5536  0.1416  0.9038   
ROMANIA 51  15  0.7339  0.1516  38.9886  0.08  0.3098  3.8735  13.3108  0.1108  0.4792  0.3725  -0.1658  0.6860   
RUSSIAN  FED.  245 115 0.2814 0.0732 30.8661  0.116  0.1918  1.6383 12.7306  0.0537  0.4001  0.4574  0.0360 0.3113  3474.444 
RWANDA 7  2  0.2680  0.0206  17.3571  0.075  0.0978  1.2992  11.5668  0.0308  0.5366  0.3893  0.0285  0.7819  274.5 
SENEGAL 6  2  0.0857  0.0130  24.4500  0.08  0.1645  2.0562  12.1589  0.0527  0.2138  0.5881  0.0983  0.6695  880 
SINGAPORE 54  10  0.0806  0.0310  24.1388  0.12  0.1213  1.0115  16.3780  0.0166  0.2901  0.5842  0.0144  0.8298  208545 
SLOVAKIA 83  15  0.1987  0.0499  17.3698  0.08  0.0936  1.1712  14.4710  0.0295  0.4409  0.4239  0.0995  0.7715  5146 
SLOVENIA  106 16 0.1262  0.0486 15.1679  0.08  0.0716  0.8959 14.2656  0.0226  0.2725  0.5606  0.0092 0.6368  12654.12 
SOUTH  AFRICA  161 29 0.2082  0.1135 18.4875  0.086  0.0982  1.1602  13.3541  0.0152  0.2245 0.6991  -0.0163 0.8593  3716 
SPAIN  252 32 0.2156  0.0483 12.8924  0.08  0.0489  0.6115  16.5977  0.0226  0.3490 0.5494  0.0244 0.7259 17570.5 
SRI LANKA  64  11  0.1556  0.0847  15.1084  0.09  0.0585  0.6697  13.2549  0.0309  0.2734  0.6061  -0.0168  0.6652  873.5 
SWEDEN  159 19 0.1393  0.0366 15.5849  0.08  0.0758  0.9481  14.9705  0.0081  0.1927 0.6989  0.0420 0.9466 43513.5 
THAILAND  130 19 0.0885  0.0343 15.5783  0.085  0.0707  0.8327  15.8362  0.0508  0.2172 0.6451  0.0574 0.4798 2182.5 
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO  14  3  0.1479  0.0470  14.7714  0.08  0.0677  0.8464  13.8422  0.0271  0.2230  0.6289  0.0714  0.8002  6642.5 
TURKEY  130 32 0.4354  0.1199 23.6825  0.08  0.1568  1.9603  15.4598  0.0285  0.4791 0.4297  0.0184 0.6897 3972.5 
UKRAINE  226 43 0.2269  0.0845 20.3157  0.08  0.1231  1.5394  12.8425  0.0717  0.2692 0.6070  0.0792 0.4704  1303 
UNITED  KINGDOM  375 52 0.2008  0.0593 19.2018  0.08  0.1120  1.4002  15.9276  0.0100  0.3495 0.4878  0.0447 0.6371 25898.5 
USA  6487  608  0.1247  0.0337  14.8666  0.08  0.0686  0.8583 14.6004  0.0147  0.1025  0.6172  0.0153 0.2377 32811 
VENEZUELA  197 44 0.5896  0.0924 27.7101  0.106  0.1707  1.6358  12.3878  0.0406  0.2597 0.4107  -0.1403 0.4290    31
VIETNAM 20  10  0.1226  0.0484  13.5840  0.08  0.0558  0.6980  14.1173  0.0213  0.3306  0.5419  0.0460  0.7022  387 
ZAMBIA 5  1  0.3409  0.1322  21.8000  0.08  0.1380  1.7250  10.7014  0.0120  0.4069  0.4848  0.0860  0.5825  419.5 
ZIMBABWE 42  9  1.2316  0.2292  21.5333  0.087  0.1277  1.4360  8.1795  0.0434  0.3987  0.3816  -0.5914  0.7348  640 
MEDIAN  0.1169  0.0393  13.16 0.08 0.048  0.5693  14.5432  0.0138 0.1957  0.5839  0.02  0.4227  1629999.
81 
MEAN  0.1946  0.0558  17.207 0.0853 0.0867  1.0078  14.6566  0.0192  0.2511  0.5541  0.0216  0.4625  22417 
STANDARD DEVIATION  0.3440  0.0623  12.2104  0.0122  0.1196  1.3771  2.1635  0.0312  0.2086  0.2006  0.1020  0.2191  2713072.
98 
Panel B: Correlations 
VARIABLES LOANRATE  COSTDEP  CAPITAL  ABUFFER  RBUFFER  SIZE  COLLATERALTA  LATA  TLNTA  GDPGR  CONC 
LOANRATE  1.000                  
COSTDEP  0.3749***  1.000                
CAPITAL  0.2599***  0.1307***  1.000              
ABUFFER  0.2479***  0.1128***  0.9952***  1.000            
RBUFFER  0.2305***  0.0903***  0.9699***  0.9848***  1.000           
SIZE  -0.1611*** -0.1054***  -0.3777***  -0.3667***  -0.3516*** 1.000           
COLLATERALTA  0.0864*** 0.1371***  0.1256***  0.1102***  0.0891*** -0.2400***  1.000         
LATA  0.3987*** 0.1585***  0.3616***  0.3426***  0.3250*** -0.1522***  0.0524***  1.000       
TLNTA  -0.4688*** -0.0925***  -0.3984***  -0.3886***  -0.3803*** 0.1087***  0.0965***  -0.7700***  1.000     
GDPG  -0.1987 -0.2359***  -0.0100  -0.0130**  -0.0101 0.0833***  -0.0969***  -0.0166**  0.0698***  1.000   





Table 2  
Interest rate spreads and capital buffers 
Regressions are estimated using the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM difference estimator for panel data with lagged dependent variables. 
The dependent variable is the lending rate spread (LOANRATE) in Panel A and the deposit rate spread (COSTDEP) in Panel B. As 
explanatory variables we include one lag of the dependent variable (LOANRATEi,t—1 or COSTDEPi,t--1), the capital buffer in relative terms 
(RBUFFER) or total capital over risk-weighted assets (CAPITAL), the natural logarithm of bank assets (SIZE), the ratio of collateral to 
total bank assets (COLLATERALTA), the ratio of liquid assets to total bank assets (LATA), the ratio of total loans to total bank assets 
(TLNTA), the country’s bank market concentration (CONC), and the growth of per capita GDP in the country (GDPGR). Regressions are 
estimated for 1990-2007. Year and country dummy variables are included for all the estimations but are not reported. T-statistics are in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
   Panel A. Dependent variable: Lending Rate Spread 
  Panel B. Dependent variable: Deposit Rate Spread      
    (1) (2) (3) (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 















RBUFFER   -0.3696** 
(-2.15) 
-0.3567** 
(-2.01)       -0.0051** 
(-2.55) 
-0.0048** 
(-2.47)    
CAPITAL      -0.0490** 
(-2.02) 
-0.0481** 

















































TLNTA     -0.0423 
(-0.02)    -0.3069 
(-0.17)     -0.0039 
(-0.13)    -0.0067 
(-0.23) 






























Year  dummies    Yes Yes Yes Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country  dummies    Yes Yes Yes Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
m1    -1.57 -1.57 -1.59 -1.59    -3.43***  -3.47***  -3.47***  -3.50*** 
m2    -0.46 -0.47 -0.47 -0.43    0.64  0.59  0.68  0.63 
#  observations    13,651 13,651 13,651 13,651    13,612  13,606  13,612  13,606 
#  banks    2,316 2,316 2,316 2,316    2,317  2,314  2317  2314 





Table 3  
Lending rate spreads and country development 
Regressions are estimated using the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM difference estimator for panel data with lagged dependent variables. 
The dependent variable is the lending rate spread. As explanatory variables we include one lag of the dependent variable 
(LOANRATEi,t—1), the capital buffer in relative terms (RBUFFER) or total capital over risk-weighted assets (CAPITAL), the natural 
logarithm of bank assets (SIZE), the ratio of collateral to total bank assets (COLLATERALTA), the ratio of liquid assets to total bank 
assets (LATA), the ratio of total loans to total bank assets (TLNTA), the country’s bank market concentration (CONC), and the growth of 
per capita GDP in the country (GDPGR). DEVELOP is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for countries classified as high income 
and upper middle income and zero otherwise. OECD takes a value of 1 for OECD countries and zero otherwise. G20 takes a value of 1 
for countries belonging to the G20 group and zero otherwise. G8 takes a value of 1 for countries belonging to the G8 group and zero 
otherwise. Regressions are estimated for 1990-2007. Year and country dummy variables are included for all the estimations but are not 
reported. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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RBUFFER /CAPITAL x DEVELOP  0.5939** 
(2.21)         0.0532** 
(1.91)      
RBUFFER /CAPITAL x OECD    0.7161** 
(2.45)          0.0947** 
(2.50)     
RBUFFER /CAPITAL x G20     0.0410 
(0.21)          0.0027 
(0.10)    
RBUFFER /CAPITAL x G8      0.3192 
(1.48)          0.0513* 
(1.73)   
RBUFFER /CAPITAL x KKZ       0.1688*** 

































































































Year  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
m1  -1.62 -1.60 -1.55 -1.56 -1.63    -1.66*  -1.66* -1.59 -1.58 -1.66* 
m2  -0.51 -0.52 -0.48 0.51 -0.52    -0.42 -0.47 -0.47 -0.49 -0.41 
#  observations  13,651 13,651 13,651 13,651 13,651    13,651 13,651 13,651 13,651 13,651 
#  banks  2,316 2,316 2,316 2,316 2,316    2,316 2,316 2,316 2,316 2,316 










Table 4  
Deposit rate spreads and country development 
Regressions are estimated using the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM difference estimator for panel data with lagged dependent variables. The dependent variable is the deposit rate spread (COSTDEP). As 
explanatory variables we include one lag of the dependent variable (COSTDEPi,t--1), the capital buffer in relative terms (RBUFFER) or total capital over risk-weighted assets (CAPITAL), the natural 
logarithm of bank assets (SIZE), the ratio of collateral to total bank assets (COLLATERALTA), the ratio of liquid assets to total bank assets (LATA), the ratio of total loans to total bank assets (TLNTA), 
the country’s bank market concentration (CONC), and the growth of per capita GDP in the country (GDPGR). DEVELOP is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for countries classified as high income 
and upper middle income and zero otherwise. OECD takes a value of 1 for OECD countries and zero otherwise. G20 takes a value of 1 for countries belonging to the G20 group and zero otherwise. G8 takes 
a value of 1 for countries belonging to the G8 group and zero otherwise. INS is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the country has a deposit insurance scheme and zero otherwise. Regressions are 
estimated for 1990-2007. Year and country dummy variables are included for all the estimations but are not reported. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
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RBUFFER /CAPITAL x DEVELOP  0.0028 
(1.18)          0.0001 
(0.45)       
RBUFFER /CAPITAL x OECD    0.0073** 
(2.08)           0.0009** 
(2.29)      
RBUFFER /CAPITAL x G20     -0.0009 
(-0.35)            -0.0002 
(-0.73)     
RBUFFER /CAPITAL x G8      0.0034 
(1.08)             0.0005 
(1.38)    
RBUFFER /CAPITAL x KKZ       0.0022*** 
(3.59)            0.0002*** 
(3.58)   
RBUFFER /CAPITAL x INS        -0.0069 





















































































































Year  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country  dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
m1  -3.44***  -3.53***  -3.44***  -3.46***  -3.55***  -3.45***    -3.47*** -3.59*** -3.47*** -3.51*** -3.61*** -3.49*** 
m2  0.63 0.64 0.60 0.62 0.62 0.60    0.66  0.71  0.65  0.66  0.69  0.63 
#  observations  13,612 13,612 13,612 13,612 13,612 13,612    1,3612  1,3612  1,3612  1,3612  13,612  13,612 
#  banks  2,317  2,317  2,317  2,317  2,317  2,317    2,317 2,317 2,317 2,317 2,317 2,317 





Interest rate spreads, capital buffers, and cyclical effects 
Regressions are estimated using the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM difference estimator for panel data with lagged dependent variables. The dependent 
variable is the lending rate spread (LOANRATE) in Panel A and the deposit rate spread (COSTDEP) in Panel B. As explanatory variables we include one 
lag of the dependent variable (LOANRATEi,t—1 or COSTDEPi,t--1), the capital buffer in relative terms (RBUFFER) or total capital over risk-weighted 
assets (CAPITAL), the natural logarithm of bank assets (SIZE), the ratio of collateral to total bank assets (COLLATERALTA), the ratio of liquid assets to 
total bank assets (LATA), the ratio of total loans to total bank assets (TLNTA), the country’s bank market concentration (CONC), and the growth of per 
capita GDP in the country (GDPGR). Regressions are estimated for 1990-2007. Year and country dummy variables are included for all the estimations 
but are not reported. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
                  
    Panel A. Dependent variable: Lending Rate Spread    Panel B. Dependent variable: Deposit Rate Spread 
    
   (1) (2) (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 






















(-2.36)       -0.0059*** 
(-2.75) 
-0.0052** 
(-2.57)    
CAPITAL      -0.0538** 
(-2.19) 
-0.0520** 





















































TLNTA     -0.0957 
(-0.05)    -0.2314 
(-0.13)     -0.0047 









































(3.45)       0.0367*** 
(2.94) 
0.0373*** 
(2.94)    
CAPITAL x GDPGR        0.4422*** 
(0.60) 
0.4465*** 




Year dummies    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country dummies    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
m1   -1.70*  -1.70*  -1.81*  -1.81*    -3.59***  -3.63***  -3.59***  -3.62*** 
m2   -1.07  -1.11  -0.77  -0.80    0.56  0.51  0.65  0.60 
# observations    13,651  13,651  13,651  13,651    13,606  13,606  13,612  13,612 
# banks    2,316  2,316  2,316  2,316    2,314  2,314  2,317  2,317 






Cyclical effects of capital buffers, lending rates, and country development 
Regressions are estimated using the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM difference estimator for panel data with lagged dependent variables. The 
dependent variable is the lending rate spread. As explanatory variables we include one lag of the dependent variable (LOANRATEi,t—1), the 
capital buffer in relative terms (RBUFFER) or total capital over risk-weighted assets (CAPITAL), the natural logarithm of bank assets (SIZE), the 
ratio of collateral to total bank assets (COLLATERALTA), the ratio of liquid assets to total bank assets (LATA), the ratio of total loans to total 
bank assets (TLNTA), the country’s bank market concentration (CONC), and the growth of per capita GDP in the country (GDPGR). DEVELOP 
is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for countries classified as high income and upper middle income and zero otherwise. OECD takes a 
value of 1 for OECD countries and zero otherwise. G20 takes a value of 1 for countries belonging to the G20 group and zero otherwise. G8 takes 
a value of 1 for countries belonging to the G8 group and zero otherwise. Regressions are estimated for 1990-2007. Year and country dummy 
variables are included for all the estimations but are not reported. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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BUFFER /CAPITAL x 
GDPGR x DEVELOP 
-5.6892*** 
(-4.33)         -0.5407*** 
(-4.68)      
BUFFER /CAPITAL x 
GDPGR x OECD    -3.1814* 
(-1.79)          -0.1434 
(-1.01)     
BUFFER /CAPITAL x 
GDPGR x G20     -1.9092 
(-0.91)           -0.0339 
(-0.23)    
BUFFER /CAPITAL x 
GDPGR x G8      -6.8222*** 
(-6.30)           -0.5400*** 
(-5.43)   
BUFFER /CAPITAL x 
GDPGR x KKZ       -1.6730*** 
(-3.80)           -0.0980*** 
(-3.19) 
Year  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
m1  -1.94* -1.73* -1.78* -1.78*  -2.25**    -2.15**  -1.81*  -1.90*  -1.88*  -2.35** 
m2  -1.47 -1.09 -1.52 -1.06  -1.75*    -1.26  -0.72  -1.10  -0.59  -1.44 
#  observations  13,651 13,651 13,651 13,651 13,651    13,651  13,651  13,651  13,651  13,651 
#  banks  2,316 2,316 2,316 2,316 2,316    2,316  2,316  2,316  2,316  2,316 




Cyclical effects of capital buffers, cost of deposits, and country development 
Regressions are estimated using the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM difference estimator for panel data with lagged dependent variables. The 
dependent variable is the deposit rate spread (COSTDEP). As explanatory variables we include one lag of the dependent variable (COSTDEPi,t--
1), the capital buffer in relative terms (RBUFFER) or total capital over risk-weighted assets (CAPITAL), the natural logarithm of bank assets 
(SIZE), the ratio of collateral to total bank assets (COLLATERALTA, the ratio of liquid assets to total bank assets (LATA), the ratio of total 
loans to total bank assets (TLNTA), the country’s bank market concentration (CONC), and the growth of per capita GDP in the country 
(GDPGR). DEVELOP is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for countries classified as high income and upper middle income and zero 
otherwise. OECD takes a value of 1 for OECD countries and zero otherwise. G20 takes a value of 1 for countries belonging to the G20 group and 
zero otherwise. G8 takes a value of 1 for countries belonging to the G8 group and zero otherwise. Regressions are estimated for 1990-2007. Year 
and country dummy variables are included for all the estimations but are not reported. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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BUFFER /CAPITAL x 
GDPGR x DEVELOP 
-0.0677*** 
(-4.11)         -0.0063*** 
(-5.16)      
BUFFER /CAPITAL x 
GDPGR x OECD    -0.0084 
(-0.46)          0.0023 
(1.51)     
BUFFER /CAPITAL x 
GDPGR x G20     -0.0114 
(-0.63)          -0.0003 
(-0.26)    
BUFFER /CAPITAL x 
GDPGR x G8      -0.0501*** 
(-3.80)          -0.063*** 
(-5.16)   
BUFFER /CAPITAL x 
GDPGR x KKZ       -0.0171*** 
(-4.16)         -0.0009*** 
(-3.22) 
Year  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
m1  -3.82*** -3.65*** -3.70***  -3.71  -4.11***    -3.89*** -3.61*** -3.66*** -3.89*** -3.98*** 
m2  0.19 0.50 0.43 0.46 0.14    0.24 0.58 0.55 0.24 0.43 
#  observations  13,612 13,612 13,612 13,612 13,612    13,612 13,612 13,612 13,612 13,612 
#  banks  2,317 2,317 2,317 2,317 2,317    2,317 2,317 2,317 2,317 2,317 
#  countries  92 92 92 92 92    92 92 92 92 92 38 
 
Table 8  
Interest rate spreads, capital buffers, and regulatory regime 
Regressions are estimated using the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM difference estimator for panel data with lagged 
dependent variables. The dependent variable is the lending rate spread (LOANRATE) in Panel A and the deposit rate spread 
(COSTDEP) in Panel B. As explanatory variables we include one lag of the dependent variable (LOANRATEi,t—1 or 
COSTDEPi,t--1), the capital buffer in relative terms (RBUFFER) or total capital over risk-weighted assets (CAPITAL), the 
natural logarithm of bank assets (SIZE), the ratio of collateral to total bank assets (COLLATERALTA), the ratio of liquid 
assets to total bank assets (LATA), the ratio of total loans to total bank assets (TLNTA), the country’s bank market 
concentration (CONC), and the growth of per capita GDP in the country (GDPGR). Basel II is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of 1 for the 2004-2007 period and zero otherwise. Regressions are estimated for 1990-2007. Year and country 
dummy variables are included for all the estimations but are not reported. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
           
    Panel A. Dependent variable: Lending 
Rate Spread 
  Panel B. Dependent variable: Deposit 
Rate Spread 
           
   (1)  (2)    (3) (4) 









RBUFFER   
 
-0.3947** 
(-2.18)      -0.0048** 
(-2.33)   
RBUFFER x BASELII    -0.1601 
(-1.39)      0.0022 
(1.54)   
CAPITAL     -0.0520** 
(-2.04)      -0.0006** 
(-2.50) 
CAPITAL x BASELII      -0.0226 
(-1.46)      0.0002 
(1.08) 


















LATA   2.0904* 
(1.74) 
2.2009* 






















Year dummies    Yes  Yes    Yes Yes 
Country dummies    Yes  Yes    Yes Yes 
m1   -1.57  -1.59    -3.43*** -3.46*** 
m2   -0.47  -0.47    0.63 0.70 
# observations    13,651  13,651    13,612 13,612 
# banks    2,361  2,316    2,317 2,317 








Table 9  
Cyclical effects of capital buffers, interest rate spreads, and regulatory regime 
Regressions are estimated using the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM difference estimator for panel data with lagged 
dependent variables. The dependent variable is the lending rate spread (LOANRATE) in Panel A and the deposit rate 
spread (COSTDEP) in Panel B. As explanatory variables we include one lag of the dependent variable (LOANRATEi,t—1 
or COSTDEPi,t--1), the capital buffer in relative terms (RBUFFER) or total capital over risk-weighted assets (CAPITAL), 
the natural logarithm of bank assets (SIZE), the ratio of collateral to total bank assets (COLLATERALTA), the ratio of 
liquid assets to total bank assets (LATA), the ratio of total loans to total bank assets (TLNTA), the country’s bank market 
concentration (CONC), and the growth of per capita GDP in the country (GDPGR). Basel II is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of 1 for the 2004-2007 period and zero otherwise. Regressions are estimated for 1990-2007. Year and country 
dummy variables are included for all the estimations but are not reported. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
       
  Panel A. Dependent variable: 
Lending Rate Spread 
  Panel B. Dependent variable: Deposit 
Rate Spread 
          
 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
COSTDEPt-1  0.2324*** 
(2.94) 
0.2341*** 




RBUFFER  -0.4270** 
(-2.48)     -0.0053** 
(-2.58)   
CAPITAL   -0.0522** 
(-2.19)     -0.0006*** 
(-2.66) 
SIZE  -1.2847 
(-1.52) 
-1.4308* 




COLLATERALTA  -1.3137 
(-0.15) 
-1.3760 




LATA  2.5785** 
(2.25) 
2.5795** 




CONC  -2.6667 
(-1.46) 
1.5924 




GDPGR  1.3918 
(0.97) 
-6.0023* 




RBUFFER x GDPGR  4.0501*** 
(3.53)     0.0308** 
(2.58)   
RBUFFER x GDPGR x BASELII  2.2761 
(1.14)     0.0702*** 
(2.77)   
CAPITAL x GDPGR    0.4203*** 
(2.67)     0.0021 
(1.57) 
CAPITAL x GDPGR x BASELII    0.1643 
(0.90)     0.0051*** 
(2.67) 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
Country dummies  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
m1 -1.80*  -1.92**    -3.70***  -3.73*** 
m2 -1.02  -0.70    0.98  1.27 
# observations  13,651  13,651    13,612  13,612 
# banks  2,316  2,316    2,317  2,317 
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